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The Manacles and the Messenger:
A Short Study in Religious Freedom in the Prison
Community
STEVEN P. FRANKINO*
[I]t seems apparent that very considerable gains had been made in terms of
human decency, that men had come to be animated by an increasing sensitivity
to human pain and suffering. This significant and obscure development . . .
contributed most immediately and notably to the rise of religious toleration.
It might be suggested, indeed, that the history of culture can in one sense be
interpreted in terms of the rising and falling curve of man's sensitivity to
cruelty and of his reaction to needless suffering. There was in religious perse-
cution a very considerable and very ugly psychological and moral element which
must be described as sadism. Innate barbarism relieved and justified itself by
the infliction of suffering for what was conceived as a moral end .... The mass
of men in England came to make a very sharp and important distinction be-
tween punishment imposed for the judicially demonstrable fact of crime and
the infliction of punishment for the retention of opinion. This must be regarded
as one of the most significant cultural gains in human history. These gains of
the human race are painfully and slowly attained and they may be lost before
the mass of men realize that they are threatened. Brutality and sadism are deeply
rooted in man's nature. They are restrained by no surer sanction than a decent
attitude toward the fact of difference, which man's biological nature apparently
teaches him to abhor but which his history has taught him he must respect in
the interest of sheer survival.'
14 JORDAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND 476-77 (1940), as
quoted in KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 16-17 (1962).
* A.B., L.L.B. (Catholic University); Assistant Professor of Law, The Catholic University
of America. The author wishes to express his indebtedness to the Rev. Donald F. Sheehy,
O.P., LL.B., Catholic Chaplain, D.C. Department of Corrections, Washington, D.C. I have
borrowed extensively from Father's speech, The Black Muslims and Religious Freedom in
Prison, delivered at the American Correctional Congress, Portland, Oregon, August 27, 1965,
in those sections which deal with the Muslim religious beliefs and the Prison Community.
Father was an eye-witness to the July, 1962, riots at Lorton and has worked with the Black
Muslims in D.C. correctional institutions for most of the period covered by this discussion.
Father Sheehy should not, however, be held responsible for any errors or conclusions ex-
pressed in this article.
The Manacles And The Messenger
THE POET PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY in his elegy on the death of John Keats
devoted many stanzas to the problem of the One and the Many.2 To him
unity and plurality were so fascinating that he could not resist speculating
on it even as he mourned his friend. Like Shelley, our society has been pre-
occupied with the political, legal and social aspects of the One and the
Many. 3 But unlike Adonais, in society the One remains and so does the Many.
The problem is to reconcile them.
We describe ourselves as a "pluralistic society"-a shorthand expression
for our continuing struggle to accommodate national unity with the rights
of the plurality of our constituent parts, be they individuals, states, religious
groups or political dissenters. The problem partakes conceptually of Shel-
ley's soaring meters and expresses itself in such pragmatic situations as the
power of a municipality to enter a private dwelling as a health measure to
control the accumulation of filth and vermin.4 From pests to poetry the
pluralistic accommodation cuts across all aspects of our national life.
Nowhere is this accommodation more poignant than in the constitutional
struggle over the religious settlement. Thomas Jefferson constructed the
metaphorical "wall of separation"' ) and at the same time laid the foundation
for a School of Divinity at the University of Virginia.6 The Mormons found
that they could believe in polygamy but couldn't practice it.7 Mrs. Madalyn
Murray of Baltimore recently insured that her son William would not have
to pray in public schools,8 and a Maryland notary has convinced the United
States Supreme Court that there is freedom from religion.9
Many chapters have already been written in this constitutional saga, but,
what has been a footnote in the struggle, is now emerging as a fascinating
arena for the refinement of our conceptions of religious liberty versus society's
interests. The arena is the prison. The contestants are members of the Black
Muslim sect. The relevant society is the prison community. Our analogies
to the open society, where our principles of religious liberty have been
Shelley, Adonais, in THE MENTOR BOOK OF MAJOR POETS 187 (Williams ed. 1963):
"The One remains, the many change and pass;
Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly;
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
Until Death tramples it to fragments .
See BROOKS, THE ONE AND THE MANY, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE MODERN WORLD (1962);
MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960); KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1962); REGAN, AMERICAN PLURALISM AND THE CATHOLIC CONSCIENCE (1963).
1 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Washington ed. 1854).
6 BRUCE, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, VOl. I (1920-21).
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
I Murray v. Curlett and companion case School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963), both reported sub nom. School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp.
0 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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worked out, limp at best when applied to a closed society in which restric-
tions and regulations are of necessity immediate and pervasive.
A statement of the problem is relatively easy. The Black Muslims teach
hatred of the white man, supremacy of the Negro race, separation of the
races, and disavow loyalty to the United States government or respect for its
officials. 10 Prison officials have found that their teachings cause antipathy
among other inmates and prison staffs, they have a disruptive effect on re-
habilitation programs, and, generally, present a "clear and present danger"
to the peaceful ordering of the prison society." As a result, various measures
from restrictions to suppression of the practice of their religion have been
imposed on Muslims. In California, 12 New York, 8 the District of Columbia,'
4
and Virginia,' 5 members of the sect have brought actions against the prison
officials claiming violation of their rights as guaranteed by the first and four-
teenth amendments.
The questions presented represent a potpourri of the problems of religious
liberty. Is the Muslim sect a religion to which the guarantees of the first
amendment attach. Does the prison inmate have a right to free exercise of
his religion. When does religious exercise represent a "clear and present
danger" to the prison community so that limitations may be placed on the
right to act as distinct from the right to believe. What restrictions, if any,
may be imposed on the right to act. Must prison officials extend to Muslim
prisoners the same facilities and privileges extended to the major Judaeo-
Christian faiths. The courts which have been presented with cases concerning
Black Muslims in District of Columbia penal institutions at Lorton, Virginia,
have dealt with each of these questions. Their decisions will be the basis of
this examination of the problem.
THE FOLLOWERS OF THE MESSENGER: THE BLACK MUSLIMS
The Muslims are a militant religious sect' 6 numbering in excess of 100,000
1o Banks v. Havener, Civil No. 3026-M, E.D. Va., Oct. 2, 1964, page 6 of opinion; In Re
Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 667, 361 P.2d 417, 419, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961), 9 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 501 (1962), 75 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1962), Comment, 35 So. CAL. L. REv. 162 (1962).
Banks v. Havener, supra note 10, at 5.
"In Re Ferguson, supra note 10; Williford v. People of California, 217 F. Supp. 245 (N.D.
Cal. 1963).
18Wright v. Wilkins, 26 Misc. 2d 1090, 210 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Brown v. Mc-
Ginnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d
233 (2d Cir. 1961).
1 Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F.Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
'Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961); Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th
Cir. 1963); Banks v. Havener, supra note 10.
11 The discription of the Black Muslim sect is mainly taken from LINCOLN, THE BLACK
MUSLIMS IN AMERICA (1961): Krosney, America's Black Supremacists, 192 NATION 390 (1961);
Hentoff, Our Negro Segregationists, Reporter, April 27, 1961, p. 52; Worthy, The Angriest
Negroes, Esquire, Feb. 1961, p. 102; MUHAMMAD, THE SUPREME WISDOM: SOLUTION To THE
So-CALLED NEGROES' PROBLEM (1957).
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members,17 founded in 1930, who claim to be an offshoot of the Islamic
religion of the Moslems. The Muslims believe in Allah as their God and
they regard their religion as Islam which teaches submission to the will of
Allah. They must pray at least five times per day and must believe in the
scriptures, including a holy book which purports to be the Koran.18 They
must believe in the resurrection and the hereafter. The sect can be differenti-
ated from Eastern Islamism in their belief in Black Supremacy, and it is this
difference which primarily gives rise to problems in the prison environment. 19
Islamic groups in America have refused to recognize them.
2 0
The Muslims believe that America's Negroes ("Black Men" as the Mus-
lims prefer to call themselves) are the "lost Nation of Islam in North
America." 2' They have now been found by Allah, and a Messenger, Elijah
Muhammad of Chicago, has been sent to prepare them for their day of
destiny. "The judgment of the world has arrived and the gathering together
of the people is now going on."'22
Fundamental to the Black Muslim movement is the "orginality" of the
Black Nation and the creation of the white race by one Yakub. 23 The Original
Man is the Black Man and he is the creator of the universe and the primo-
genitor of all other races. The white race has white skin because it was grafted
from the original black nation. This phenomenon, as explained by Muham-
mad, is:
The Black Man has two germs (two people) in him. One is black and the
other is brown. The brown germ is weaker than the black germ. The brown
germ can be grafted into its last stage, and the last stage is white. A scientist by
the name of Yakub discovered this knowledge . . . 6,645 years ago, and was
successful in doing this job of grafting after 600 years of following a strict and
rigid birth control law. '
11 LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 4. As of December, 1960 the Muslims had 69 estab-
lishments (temples or missions) in 27 states. Ibid.
" The Muslims refer to their holy book as the Qur-an which seems to be a selectively
edited version of the Moslem orthodox Koran. Muhammad Speaks, Nov. 20, 1964, p. 24, col.
2. A summary of Muslim beliefs are set out in LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 16. The basic
doctrines may be found in a book by their leader Elijah Muhammad. MUHAMMAD, op. cit.
supra note 16. At least one court has intimated that the prison authorities must purchase
the edition of the Koran requested by Muslim prisoners (an edition published in Pakistan
in 1951). Pierce v. La Vallee, supra note 13, at 236.
"E.g., Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 14, at 377-78.
20 The Muslims have not been recognized by the Official Islamic Association of the United
States and Canada, nor been allowed to affiliate with the association. LINCOLN, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 219. In view of Muslim belief in black supremacy, it is ironic that orthodox
Islamic belief has recently been characterized thusly: "Essential to Islam in its purity is
freedom from any racial prejudice and the sense that Moslems are, both in a mystical and
real sense, all brothers." BROOKS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 147.
2MUHAMMAD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 21.
2Id. at 17.
2" Muhammad, Mr. Muhammad Speaks, Pittsburgh Courier, July 4, 1959.
2"Ibid. See also, LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 21, 24.
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This experiment "had an unfortunate side effect" in that it peopled the
world with "blue-eyed devils," who were of comparatively low physical and
moral stamina-a reflection of their distance from the "divine blacks".25
Four hundred years ago, the white Christians stole the Black Muslims
away from their homes and brought them to North America where the whites
were already in the process of systematic genocide against the Indians. The
whites enslaved the Blacks and insured their bondage by robbing them of
their names (identity), language (cultural continuity) and religion (protec-
tion of their God). By taking from them their name the whites both shamed
them and effectively "hid" them from their own kind. By making Black Men
accept European names, the Whites branded them as property. By requiring
them to speak English rather than their native Arabic, the whites cut their
slaves off from their cultural heritage and the knowledge of self which is
essential to dignity and freedom.
The Christian religion was and is the master stratagem for keeping the
negro enslaved. The whites gave him the "poisoned book" (the Bible) and
required him to join the "slave religion" (Christianity), which teaches him
to love his oppressor and to pray for them who persecute him. Thus the
Black Men are Muslims by nature while Christianity is a white man's religion.
There is not even a possibility of an awakened Black Man accepting Christi-
anity, nor can the white man accept Islam as taught by Muhammad, for the
white man is a devil by nature.26
The core of this dogma, then, is hatred of the white man and the supremacy
of the Black Man. One expert witness has testified:
I don't know any other religion that teaches racial hatred as an essential part
of the faith of the religion. There are many religions which have practiced racial
hatred at various times, but this movement is the only movement that I know
of which makes it a tenet of the faith that all white people should be hated.'
Elijah Muhammad portrays the white race as a race of total evil-a race of
devils, murderers, thieves, robbers, scientist at tricks, world snoopers, med-
dlers, and liars.28 For this reason he teaches that to survive, Negroes and
11 The Muslims hold that this is proved by the fact that white athletes are poor com-
petitors against black athletes. They take great pride in the accomplishments of Negro
athletes, especially Muslims. The current example is Muhammad Ali (nee Cassius Clay)
sometime heavyweight champion. Universal Salute to Champ All, Muhammad Speaks, Nov.
20, 1964, p. 5, col. 2.
Muhammad, Mr. Muhammad Speaks, Pittsburgh Courier, December 13, 1958: These
"devils" were given 6,000 years to rule. During their reign the devils have "deceived the
black nations of the earth, trapped and murdered them by the hundreds of thousands,
divided and put black against black, corrupted and committed fornication before your very
eyes with your women ... (and then made) you confess that you love them. .. "
7 Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 14, at 373. (testimony of Father Chas. M. Whelan).
-"Ibid.
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whites must be separated, a vague political aspiration for the establishment
of separate black states.
29
In their everyday lives the Black Muslims are governed by a stringent code
of private and social morality.30 Besides the required prayers, they are for-
bidden to eat certain foods such as pork and cornbread, and many other
foods common to the diet of negroes, particularly in the South, since they
constitute a "slave diet."3' They are forbidden whiskey, tobacco and nar-
cotics, and sexual morality is ultra-puritanical. For these reasons, it has been
claimed that the Muslim faith has a rehabilitating effect on prisoners, creat-
ing "model prisoners."
3 2
Prison authorities have found that the individual Muslim is very devoted
to his faith, generally, and that it "is in some way related to increasing his
status as a negro ..... 33 In the case of one prisoner it was noted that the
"main attraction of the Muslim faith is that it gave him something to associ-
ate himself with, something to uplift him from the degradation to which he
had fallen."
84
Whether the Muslim is a model prisoner or not, the Muslims in prison
have been subjected to many deprivations of their practice of religion. It has
been suggested that the basis of this proscription is threefold:
First, the Black Muslim movement-strange, separatist, arrogant, anti-
Christian, and Negro-is an extremely attractive target for prejudice. Second,
the very success of the Muslim proselytizing in prisons results in a high percent-
age of their new preachers being ex-convicts, some of whom have extensive
previous criminal records. . . .Third, and probably most important, despite
the success of Muslim teaching in reforming the personal habits of new con-
verts, available evidence indicates its frequent failure to make Muslim convicts
into the "model prisoners" Malcolm X describes. Riots, prompted by disputes
over religiously unacceptable prison food, proselytizing in the exercise yard,
2 LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 94, 95.
o Krosney, op. cit. supra note 16.
MUHAMMAD, Op. cit. supra note 16, at 21, 42: Eating these foods means a "slow death"
to those who eat them. Lamb, chicken, fish and beef are approved but all foods must be
strictly fresh. The hog is considered filthy--"a poisoned food, hated by Allah"--and was
never intended to be eaten except by the white race.
ISee address by Malcolm X, Boston University Human Relations Center, Feb. 15, 1960,
in LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 82-83.
"He (Elijah Muhammad) has taken men who were thieves, who broke the law-men
who were in prison-and reformed them so that no more do they steal, no more do they
commit crimes against the government.... the Black Man who is a hardened criminal hears
the teachings of Mr. Muhammad, immediately he makes an about face. Where the warden
couldn't straighten him out through solitary confinement, as soon as he became a Muslim,
he begins to become a model prisoner right in that institution, far more than whites or so-
called Negroes who confess Christianity." C. Eric Lincoln in his definitive work on the
Black Muslims accepts these assertions. Id. at 82.
1 Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 14, at 372.
14 Id. at 373. The prisoner Fulwood was a convert to the Muslim sect while in prison.
1965]
Catholic University Law Review
and refusals by individual Muslims to obey white guards have occurred in a
number of prisons.5
THE ANGUISH AT LORTON
Perhaps nothing can be more exciting than to witness public functionaries
working out solutions to seemingly insoluble problems. The nature of the
prison community from our traditional viewpoint recommends absolute
control of management by those charged with management. The nature of
religious freedom demands tolerance and non-interference. The nature of
pluralism requires parity of treatment as well as acceptance of difference. The
imperatives of these three areas collided when the courts opened the door to
a consideration of the right of Muslims within the closed prison society.
Viewed in this way the challenge to the courts in the Lorton penal institu-
tion cases takes on dimensions suitable to a major constitutional crisis. It
should not be forgotten that, in a larger sense, the nature of the prison com-
munity was on trial in these cases.
The four Lorton cases with which this discussion will be concerned are:
Sewell v. Pegelow,3 6 Fulwood v. Clemmer,37 Childs v. Pegelow,38 and Banks
v. Havender.89 Each case involves the rights of Muslims in prisons maintained
by the District of Columbia.
A. Sewell v. Pegelow
In 1961 Theodore X. A. Sewell and Joseph X. Watson were prisoners in the
United States Reformatory at Lorton, Virginia. They were members of the
Black Muslims, as were thirty-six other Lorton residents. All of the Black
Muslims had been put in isolation for 90 days where they had "one teaspoon
of food for eating [and] a slice of bread at each meal three times per day."
40
The cells contained no furniture and the floors were concrete. The inmates
were provided with a blanket and mattress between 10:00 p.m. and 5:30 a.m.
They were forbidden to wear medals symbolic of their faith, the opportunity
to write to religious advisors, recite prayers publicly or receive religious pub-
lications.41 Sewell and Watson maintained that this treatment was meted
out solely because of their religious convictions and not for any breach of
disciplinary rules or regulations of the Reformatory. They attempted to com-
plain to and seek redress from the Board of Commissioners of the District of
Columbia but the superintendent of Lorton, Paul F. Pegelow, and other
prison officials refused to transmit their complaints.
5 Comment, Black Muslims in Prison, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1488, 1491-92 (1962).
Supra note 15.
87 Supra note 14.
11 Supra note 15.
1 Supra note 10.
40 Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 15, at 197.
[Vol. XIV
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Actions were begun in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, which had jurisdiction over Lorton.42 They sought an order
to restrain the officials of the reformatory from continuing to harass them
and from denying their constitutional rights to free exercise of their religion.
The District Court, without requiring the officials to show cause or answer,
and without holding a hearing, dismissed on the grounds that the matters
alleged related to the discipline and conduct of the internal affairs of the re-
formatory, which are exclusively within the authority of the executive.43 The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the complaints stated enough to
require a hearing.
44
Chief Judge Sobeloff, while recognizing that the maintenance of discipline
in a prison is an executive function and that courts ordinarily will not inter-
fere, found that Sewell and Watson were not complaining of deprivations and
hardships because of infractions of disciplinary rules but rather ones imposed
"solely because of what the appellants describe as their religion." 45 While
certain rights are withdrawn from a person on entering prison, a prisoner is
not "entirely bereft of all of his civil rights" and does not "forfeit every pro-
tection of the law."'46 Prisoners may invoke the provisions of the Federal Civil
Rights Act "since that Act applies to any person within the jurisdiction of
the United States." 47 The traditional difficulty of non-justicibility in prison
cases was overcome by grounding the cause of action on the Civil Rights Act,
thus avoiding the pitfalls of extraordinary writs such as habeas corpus and
mandamus.
48
The problems of Sewell and Watson were not finally settled until May
23rd, 1962, when the District Commissioners issued a policy order 49 regarding
nondiscrimination in the Lorton Reformatory. The order provides that Mus-
lims will have available to them copies of the Koran and other prayer books,
be allowed to correspond with Muslim leaders, meet for prayer, study and




41 Id. at 198.
"Id. at 197.
4" Id. at 198. REv. STAT. §§ 1977-91 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-95 (1958); see 2 J. PUB. L. 181,
185 (1953); Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996, 998 (N.D.Ill. 1949), afJ'd,180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990, rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 847 (1950).
47 Ibid.
4This paper will not concern itself with procedural obstacles to prisoner's presentation
of claims. For a discussion of the developing law in this field see generally Note, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 985 (1962).
"1 Order of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia No. 6514-B, Nov. 25, 1953,
known as Policy Order of the District of Columbia Government Regarding Nondiscrimi-
nation of Nov. 25, 1953, as amended on March 4, 1954; April 7, 1955; and May 23, 1962. A
copy of the order is in a letter of assurances filed in Sewell v. Pegelow, 304 F.2d 670 (4th
Cir. 1962). See discussion of the Policy Order infra.
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conducted by a minister of the Muslim sect.50
Rather than settling the issues, however, Sewell v. Pegelow was only the
initial skirmish in a four year struggle with the District of Columbia Depart-
ment of Corrections.
B. Fulwood v. Clemmer 1
William T. X. Fulwood was serving a term in the Lorton Reformatory for
robbery. He was a recent convert to the Muslim faith, although he had first
learned of the Islamic faith of the Moslems while serving with the Army in
Korea. In September, 1959, Fulwood and several other Muslims requested
permission from Donald Clemmer, Director of the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections, to hold religious services. Clemmer denied their
request on the ground that the teachings of the Muslims were inflammatory
and would be likely to create disorders and disturbances.5 2
Since the Muslims had been refused permission to hold religious services,
they met informally in the stands of the recreation field.53 Their meetings
were peaceful, and the prison regulations specifically allowed the inmates to
meet on the field and to talk. On May 25, 1960, about fifteen Muslims met
in the stands while a ball game was in progress. Fulwood preached for twenty
minutes in a loud voice on the writings of Elijah Muhammed,54 making
references to the white race as murderers, thieves and liars. There were six
prison guards on the field while he was speaking, and six or seven hundred
inmates.
Fulwood was punished for the May 25th incident because the prison
officials felt that his preaching was of such a character as to tend to breach
the peace. 55 Fulwood was placed in a control cell 56 and kept there for 13 days.
He was then transferred to the D.C. jail and placed in a Special Treatment
50 Ibid.
Supra note 14.
Id. at 373. In Lorton there were 1,725 inmates, 1,500 colored and 225 white; of the 1,500
colored inmates, only 50 or less are Muslims. The prison population is overwhelmingly
Protestant. Id. at 374.
5
8 Id. at 377.
"Id. at 377. On cross examination he admitted that he "made references to the white race
as liars, thieves, and murderers, that he said the white man can not be trusted, that it was
the tough luck of the black men that they 'fought for the white man in the war' and more
of the like." Ibid.
Id. at 378.
A control cell is a cell in a special building. It is approximately eight feet by twelve
feet, with a stone floor and stone walls on three sides. There is no window, so that no
natural light enters the cell, and the single artificial light is controlled from outside the
cell. There is no bed; a mattress is placed on the floor at ten o'clock at night and taken out
at six o'clock in the morning. The toilet has no top and in most cases is not flushable from
inside the cell. An inmate in a control cell is allowed no reading matter, no exercise, no
visitors, no mail unless of an emergency nature, and only occasionally a shave and shower.
Regardless of the time of year, an inmate in the control cell is allowed to wear only coveralls
and shoes without laces. A restricted diet of 2,000 calories daily is given. For breakfast he
usually receives some dry cereal and water, and for lunch and dinner some potatoes and a
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Unit,57 was later placed in a control cell and afterwards returned to a STU
cell. He was then placed in a transient section of the jail.58
During a two year period, Fulwood was never allowed to return to the
general inmate population of either Lorton or the D.C. jail. Other than his
religious activities, Fulwood never had any other disciplinary report except
one. Evidence also showed that he had a heart murmur and suffered from
bronchitis.59
In addition to the incident on the recreation field, several other clashes
occurred between Fulwood and the prison officials. He was, for example,
denied permission to wear a religious medal,6 0 although prisoners of the
Catholic and Protestant faiths were allowed to wear them, and in fact, such
medals were issued to the prisoners and paid for with public funds. Fulwood
was also refused permission to correspond with Elijah Muhammed, and his
subscription to the Los Angeles Herald Dispatch, which carries a column by
Muhammed, was confiscated.61 Further, when Fulwood came up for parole,
his letter to his counsel had not been forwarded by the Superintendent's
office of the prison, so that when his parole hearing came up, his counsel had
not heard of the hearing.62 The parole was refused. On several occasions,
Fulwood attempted to notify the District Commissioners of his grievances,
but his complaints were never forwarded by Clemmer.
Fulwood brought a proceeding in the District Court of the District of
Columbia for a writ of mandamus and an alternative writ of habeas corpus.
On the basis of the foregoing history, Judge Matthews made the following
conclusions of law: 1) that the Muslim faith is a religion;6 3 2) that prison
officials discriminated against the Muslims in not making facilities available
without regard to race or religion; 64 3) that Fulwood had been denied his
right to counsel in connection with the parole hearing;65 4) that denial of the
religious medal was discrimination; 5) that the two year punitive detention
was not reasonably related to the infraction on the ball field and was in fact
vegetable or two with bread and water. Regulations forbid placing a man in a control cell
for a stay longer than 15 days. Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 14, at 378.
Id. at 379. A Special Treatment Unit (STU) is a special cell in which a number of re-
strictions are imposed on the inmate. For example, an STU inmate is fed in his cell, so that
his food is usually cold, he is not permitted to work except on the range, and he is not
allowed movies, television, rehabilitation program, Saturday visits, etc. Ibid.
51 The transient section of the jail involves restrictions such as: no money allowance, no
movies or television, no free letter privileges, less exercise, no holiday plays, fewer canteen
privileges, no rehabilitation program, no Saturday visits, etc. Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra
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unreasonable; 6 6) refusal to forward letters to the Commissioners and punish-
ment for what was written in the complaints was a violation of his right to
seek redress of grievances. 7 Judge Matthews also found that refusal to corre-
spond with Elijah Muhammed and to receive the Los Angeles Dispatch were
not violations of Fulwood's legal rights,6 8 and that the incident of the playing
field was a violation of prison regulations tending to menace order, and that
Fulwood could be punished for this infraction, although not unreasonably.69
C. Childs v. Pegelow
7°
The month of December, 1962, corresponded with the Islamic month of fast-
ing from sunup to sunset, the holy month of Ramadan. In November, 1962,
the superintendent of the Lorton Reformatory, Pegelow, told the Muslims
that they would be allowed to fast during the month of Ramadan, and imple-
mented his decision by changing the time of the evening meal from 4:15 to
5:00. He also ordered that all Muslims be fed a pork-free diet.7 1 The change
in meal time corresponded with the time set for sunset by official government
computation.7 2 However, the Muslim "sunset" was computed according to
the time when it is impossible to distinguish a white thread from a black
thread when held side by side.
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On December 8, 1962, James H. Childs filed a petition for a temporary in-
junction to require the reformatory officials to feed all Muslims at Lorton a
full-course pork-free meal after "sundown" during the month of December.
7 4
The District Court dismissed the suit as moot because relief prayed for
would have been effective only during the month of December, 1962, the suit
having been heard on January 3rd, 1963. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.
75
Judge Boreman, writing for the court, held that there was no justiciable
MId. at 375.
0
7 Id. at 377.
0 1 Id. at 375.
MId. at 379.
70 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963).
nId. at 489.
72id. at 488. During the month of December sunrise in the District of Columbia and
Northern Virginia is no earlier than 7:07 a.m. and sunset is no later than 4:56 p.m. This in-
formation was based on a table prepared by the National Almanac Office, United States
Naval Observatory. It was on the basis of this official prediction that the prison authorities
calculated dinner hours, however, there is still light at this time. The Muslims could not,
technically, eat even at the changed time. See note 73 infra.
11 As a result of the fact that sunset calculated by official standards and as calculated by
Muslim standards conflicted the Muslim inmates alleged that their religious freedom was
violated. The dietary laws of Ramadan are strictly observed by orthodox Muslims.
74 Id. at 489. Twenty additional petitions were filed and the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. A hearing was held on
December 21. James 15 X and another prisoner were allowed to examine witnesses, but the
Court refused to appoint counsel because the hearing would run into the Christmas recess,
while relief could only be granted during December.
71Id. at 491.
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issue presented because the time of meals is a matter of internal prison man-
agement. He found that the demands of the Muslims, if met, would disrupt
the prison dining routine.
76
Chief judge Sobeloff dissented on the grounds that the petitioners were
entitled to counsel at the hearing, that the allegations contained serious
questions concerning religious freedom, and that as Ramadan would occur
each year the question could not be considered moot. He noted that all of
the facts concerning the dietary restrictions of the plaintiffs' religion and the
facts concerning management of the prison should be ascertained so that
the court could "undertake to what extent there may be a balancing of the
plaintiff's religious rights against administrative necessity or convenience."
77
D. Banks v. Havener
Following the Sewell, Fulwood and Childs cases the treatment of the Mus-
lims' religious problem at Lorton Reformatory and the District of Columbia
jail has remained substantially within the directives of the District Commis-
sioners' Nondiscrimination Order. The issue was settled, therefore, with re-
gard to two of the three major penal institutions of the District of Columbia.
The third institution is also at Lorton, Virginia, and is known as the District
of Columbia Youth Center. The inmates at the Youth Center are confined
pursuant to sentence under the Federal Youth Corrections Act.79 The prob-
lems of the Black Muslims in the prison environment were presented in more
extreme circumstances at this institution.
Pursuant to the letter of assurances filed with the Court of Appeals in the
Sewell case, the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Correc-
tions permitted the free exercise of Muslim rituals at the Youth Center.80
Riots broke out at the prison. The Youth Center suffered extensive dam-
age, and prison employees were injured. Less than a month later, another dis-
turbance took place while some of the riot participants were being trans-
ferred to the D.C. jail.8' Prison Director Clemmer concluded that the Muslims
7 Ibid. Judge Boreman stated:
The establishment of dining hours for December prior to the earliest sunrise and after
the latest sunset indicates a good faith effort to carry out the arrangement as defendants
obviously understood it. It would appear that the prison authorities are entitled to plaintiffs'
commendation for their efforts to cooperate but should not be subjected to court interference
with the routine management of the institution. Certainly, each plaintiff should under-
stand that he was shown much more consideration than a prisoner is legally entitled to ask
and receive. The obvious way in which the plaintiffs may assure their right to the free and
unfettered practice of their religion in its every detailed teaching and custom is to earn
the right to live outside the federal prison. Id. at 491.
77 Id. at 491, 492.
" Civil No. 3026-M, E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 1964.
18 U.S.C. § 5010.
80 See supra note 49.
11d. at 4.
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were the "motivating influence" of the disturbances. Since that time all for-
mal Muslim activity at the Youth Center has been forbidden.8 2
The restriction on Muslim activity was justified by the Director because of
the experience of the July riot, and because the teachings and dogma of the
Muslims are disruptive of the rehabilitative concept at the Youth Center,
which calls for an atmosphere of harmony, free of tension. He concluded,
therefore, that the practice of the Muslim faith at the Youth Center should
be prohibited. 88
Fifteen Black Muslims at the Youth Center filed suits under the Federal
Civil Rights Act alleging discrimination on the basis of their religion in that
they were denied "the rights and privileges accorded other religious faiths."8 4
Judge Oren Lewis found that the Directors' conclusion that the Muslims
were "the motivating influence" in the riot was not without some support in
the record, but concluded that "the evidence is not conclusive that the 1962
riots were instigated or led by members of the Black Muslims. (Other in-
mates equally participated in the riots). '85 He also concluded that the prob-
ability of future Muslim-inspired riots was speculative at best, that antipathy
of other inmates and staff would not be sufficient to justify suppression of
religious freedom, and that the alleged disruptive effect on the rehabilitation
program was equally insufficient.
On the question of discrimination, the court found that adherents of other
religions had participated in the riots and yet their religious practices were
neither suppressed nor curtailed. It was noted that Muslim religious practices
were permitted at the D.C. jail and Lorton, and that this discrimination,
coupled with the discrimination within the Youth Center, violated the orders
of the District Commissioners and the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. 86
An order enforcing this opinion was entered on October 27th, 1964, bring-
ing up to date this survey of the judicial struggle between the Department of
Corrections and the Black Muslims.
While this history will be the basis of an analysis of religious freedom in
prisons, there have been other significant cases, especially in New York87 and
California,8 8 which have concerned the Black Muslims and other religions
in the same or similar contexts.








'Wright v. Wilkins, 26 Misc. 2d 1090, 210 N.Y.S. 309 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Brown v. McGinnis,
10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E. 2d 791, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 497 (1962); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1961).
'SIn Re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 667, 361 P.2d 417, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961); Williford
v. People of California, 217 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
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or collaterally in the four cases concerning the Lorton penal institutions rep-
resents a fair selection of the questions basic to any consideration of religious
freedom in the prison community. An analysis of the issues presented should
elucidate at least a tentative answer to the fundamental constitutional ques-
tion. That question, as stated by Chief Judge Sobeloff in the Childs case, is
"the abstract legal issue as to whether, and if so how far, the enjoyment of
religious freedom, which is guaranteed by the First Amendment, may be cir-
cumscribed for prison inmates."8 9 Yet the question need not be, and, indeed,
is not limited to the prison. It is but a species of the larger question, i.e.,
whether, and if so how far, religious freedom may be circumscribed.
THE CLOSED SOCIETY: RIGHTS OF THE INMATE
The greatest barrier to the recognition of any rights in prisoners has been the
nature of the prison and the derivative judgment that the prison is exclusively
under the control of the executive. The inmate has been viewed as a "slave"
for the duration of his incarceration.9 0 The fundamental premise was that the
criminal not only lost his liberty but all his rights. The courts might speak
of privileges which the law "in its humanity accords," but the result was more
of law and little of humanity. Abysmal conditions were viewed as the
prisoners' lot and approved as a less than subtle means of deterrence. The
excesses which jar the senses in Les Miserable and the folksongs of the chain
gangs were too often the rule rather than the exception. In 1939 the Attorney
General's Survey of Release Procedures pointed up the fact that there had
been no significant change in prison conditions in many states in over one
hundred and fifty years.91 The walled-off prison community was by concession
tyrannical. All that the inmate could expect was whatever was dispensed by
grace of his wardens. But tyranny in structure and philosophy often leads to
tyrannical abuses. The prison reform movement was a popular and humani-
tarian reaction to this fact. As society became more sophisticated in dealing
with psychological and social problems it became apparent to many that vin-
dictive punishment in prisons warped the prisoner and created personalities
incapable of rehabilitation or a coming to terms with society after release.
While public order and the protection of society demands the deprivation
of some rights it need not mean the loss of all rights. Many states
have enacted what are known as "civil death" statutes.9 2 Generally, these
I Childs v. Pegelow, supra note 70, at 492.
"' Ruflin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871): "He 'the convicted felon'
has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights
except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave
of the State." Ibid. As quoted in Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
9 5 U.S. ATr'Y GEN., SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 29 (1939).
92 See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § 510-a (voting rights); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-4804 (1949); CAL.
CONST. art. 11, § 1; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2600-01; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 29.01.080, 29.07.070.
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deprive the inmate of the right to vote, to hold public office, state citizen-
ship, and certain contractual rights. A new theory of penology has gradually
emerged, however, based on the premise that prison regulations and regimen-
tation are for the maintenance of the order in the prison community and not
for the infliction of additional punishment for the crime for which the
prisoner was sentenced. This so-called "New Penology" has been the basis
for the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.93 The same philosophy
has also emerged in judicial decisions. In Price v. Johnson9 4 the Supreme
Court underlined this change by recognizing that "a prisoner retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary impli-
cation, taken from him by law." 95 Any additional punishment in excess of
that permitted by the judgment or constitutional guarantees "should be sub-
ject to inquiry, for a prisoner once validly convicted ... is not to be divested
of all rights and unalterably abandoned and forgotten by the remainder of
society."9 6 Indeed, the state's "right to detain a person is entitled to no
greater application than its correlative duty to protect him from unlawful
and onerous treatment ... "97
The courts have come full circle in the past eighty years from the position
that the criminal forfeited all his rights "except those which the law in its
humanity accords him" to the premise that the criminal retains all rights
"except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."
The crux of the problem today, then, is what rights may be taken fiom him.
Any answer to this question would of necessity depend on the nature of the
relevant society within which the restrictions and the rights operate, i.e., the
prison.
It is axiomatic that the prison community is not an open and free society;
it is better described as a "walled-off subsociety."9 8 One of the basic rights of
men living in an open society is freedom of movement; and the basic punish-
ment exacted in the prison is restriction of that freedom. The goal of the
prison community is to maintain an ordered society which confines and
houses those who have an abhorrence of confinement. Obviously, the basis
for the reluctance of courts to interfere with prison management is the neces-
sity of wide discretion in prison officials in containing and disciplining this
(1951); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-17 (1953) (public office and employment); MONT. REV.
CoDES ANN. § 94-4720 (Supp. 1959); R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 13-6-1 (1956). See generally 37
VA. L. REV. 105 (1951); 34 VA. L. REV. 463 (1948); Comment, 26 So. CAL. L. REV. 425 (1953).
"' MODEL PENAL CODE Parts III and IV (1962). See Wechsler, et al., Symposium on the
Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 590-686, 617-18 (1963).
o' 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
Id. at 285.
People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E.2d 725, 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d
44, 45-46 (1961).
"Ibid.
98 Comment, supra note 35, at 1488.
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peculiar society.99 Only obedience to prison rules will maintain control over
large numbers of prisoners "many of whom are hardened, desperate, incor-
rigible criminals. Lax control.. . will inevitably lead to... mutiny.. . so as
to endanger the lives of prison officers and the maintenance of our prison
system."1 00
Empowering statutes usually state the purpose of the correctional institu-
tion. The District of Columbia Department of Corrections and the Federal
Prison system, of which it is a part, are directed by statute0 to provide suit-
able quarters, safekeeping, care, discipline, instruction, protection, subsist-
ence, rehabilitation, and reformation. The statutes also grant the prison
authorities the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the govern-
ment of the institutions. These restrictions, under the influence of the
theories of "New Penology"' 0 2 insure the well-being and order of the prison
as a whole and are not intended to be punitive as such to any individual.
The nature of the prison community and the necessity, arising out of its
nature, to give wide discretionary scope to prison officials has given rise to a
general rule that courts will not interfere with the conduct of a prison, with
the enforcement of its rules and regulations, or its discipline. 0 3 This rule is,
Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Ban-
miller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1961); Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F. Supp. 706 (M.D.
Pa. 1949); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949); Wright v. Wilkins, 26 Misc. 2d
1090, 210 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 940 (1955); Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957).
'100 O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal. App. 2d 449, 459, 109 P. 2d 8, 15 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
01 18 U.S.C. § 4042: "The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General,
shall-
(1) have charge of the management and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional
institutions;
(2) provide suitable quarters and provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of
all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States, or held as wit-
nessess or otherwise;
(3) provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or
convicted of offenses against the United States."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-442: "The Department of Corrections is established to provide for
the custody, care, discipline, and instruction of all persons committed to the Workhouse,
Lorton Reformatory, Women's Reformatory, and the D.C. Jail in such a manner as to
achieve their maximum rehabilitation and reformation.... Said Department of Corrections
under the general direction and supervision of the Commissioners of the District of Colum-
bia shall have charge of the management and regulation of the Workhouse at Occaquan in
the State of Virginia, the Reformatory at Lorton in the State of Virginia, and the Washing-
ton Asylum and Jail, and be responsible for the safekeeping, care, protection, instruction,
and discipline of all persons committed to such institutions. The Department of Corrections
with the approval of the Commissioners shall have power to promulgate rules and regula-
tions for the government of such institutions and to establish and conduct industries, farms,
and other activities, to classify the inmates, and to provide for their proper treatment, care,
rehabilitation, and reformation.
'oeSupra note 91 and 93.
1°3 See Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); White v. Clemmer, Ill U.S.
App. D.C. 145, 295 F.2d 132 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 992 (1962); Haskins v. United States,
292 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1961); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
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however, in conflict with the concept of the prisoner's possession of all rights
except those necessary for maintenance of the institution. It is clear that these
rights are hollow if the courts will not take judicial cognizance of them.1
0 4
The District Court in Sewell v. Pegelow dismissed the complaint on the
basis that it was without jurisdiction because the matters alleged related to
the discipline and conduct of the internal affairs of Lorton Reformatory,
which are exclusively within the authority of the Executive Department.1 5
The allegations by Sewell and Watson stated that they were denied prison
privileges and suffered hardships solely because of their religious beliefs, and
that they had not breached any rule or regulation of the prison. Chief Judge
Sobeloff distinguished judicial interference in such a case on the basis that
the allegations were not "an attack upon disciplinary measures taken by
authorities"' 06 nor bare conclusory allegation of a denial of constitutional
rights. "There is," he wrote, "an extensive detailed specification of depriva-
tions and hardships inflicted for no infraction of any rule, and solely because
of what appellants describe as their religion."' 0 7 He then noted that allega-
tions were also made of suppression of efforts to obtain administrative relief.
"In these circumstances the case is manifestly unlike those in which courts
have declined to interfere because particular disciplinary measures were
taken within the normal management of the institution."
' 0
On the contrary, the majority in Childs v. Pegelow rested its decision on
the general rule of non-interference. 00 The court, speaking through judge
Boreman, found that the setting of the time for meals during Ramadan was
not within the exceptions to the rule."10
Chief Judge Sobeloff dissented on the basis inter alia, that the court read
the complaint too strictly and should have looked behind the allegations
where it would have found a question of religious freedom."' It should be
350 U.S. 971 (1956); Dayton v. McGranery, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 24, 201 F.2d 711 (1953); Hen-
son v. Welch, 199 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1952); Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952);
Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952), afJ'd on rehearing, 194 F2d 917, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 822 (1952); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829
(1951); Strum v. McGrath, 177 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1949); Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108
(10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 US. 888 (1949); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.
1949); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
114 United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F.Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).




1"1 Childs v. Pegelow, supra note 93.
1 01d. at 490. Judge Boreman put it this way:
There is no charge here of discrimination against the plaintiffs by way of interference with
the practice of their religious beliefs as in Sewell v. Pegelow. Nothing could be more routine
in prison administration than determining dining hours and practices. The plaintiffs are,
in fact, seeking privileges because of their religious beliefs, privileges not extended to the
other inmates.
m Id. at 491-2.
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noted that both Judge Boreman and Chief Judge Sobeloff used the same
criterion as to non-interference. If there is a constitutional issue then the
courts will interfere. Illegal acts or omissions of prison authorities give rise
to justiciable issues as do complaints "alleging deprivations of constitution-
ally and legally protected rights.""
n 2
The question as to non-interference would seem settled. It is interesting to
note that neither the Fulwood nor the Banks courts felt it necessary to discuss
the issue. In light of Sewell they assumed that the court would interfere. This
solution in the Lorton cases is sound in that it is grounded on an enlightened
attitude toward the prison community and recognizes that that attitude is
meaningless if the courts do not vindicate prisoners' rights. Given the author-
itarian nature of the prison, strict non-interference would be an invitation to
revert to slave penology, especially when an unpopular dissident group is
involved. Under these circumstances, to say that rights are non-justiciable is
to say there are no rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE CLOSED SOCIETY
Granted that it is settled that rights of prisoners are to be given judicial cog-
nizance, the question is what rights will be recognized. In recent years there
has been an increasing recognition on the part of courts, especially Federal
courts, that prisoners must have access to judicial tribunals. 113 This has been
the case in regard to challenges to the validity of conviction," 4 the right of
appeal," 5 and the right to retain counsel." 6 The prisoners' right to mail legal
documents to the clerk of the proper court has also been recognized," 7 as
has the right to communicate with counsel.
The question of the right to counsel was presented to the District Court
for the District of Columbia in the Fulwood case." 8 The officials at Lorton
had delayed transmitting a letter to Fulwood's counsel concerning his parole
hearing. Counsel had not received notice until after the hearing. Judge
Matthews held that Fulwood "was clearly entitled to send to and receive
2 Id. at 490.
'See e.g., Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd sub nom. Hatfield
v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); ex parte Robinson, 112
Cal. App. 2d 626, 246 P.2d 982 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361
P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961); United States ex rel. Foley v.
Ragen, 52 F. Supp. 265 (N.D. Ill. 1943), rev'd, 143 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1944); Sweet v. State,
233 Ind. 160, 117 N.E.2d 745 (1954).
11 Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
15 Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d
561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
People v. Howard, 166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
16 United States ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, supra note 117; White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760
(1945).
17Spires v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1959).
1"3 Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 73, at 376.
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from his counsel communications as to his parole and alleged violations of
his rights as a prisoner." 119 The court also found that under the nondiscrimi-
nation order of the District Commissioners Fulwood could not be denied the
right, either by delay, or because of alleged repetitiousness, to have complaints
transmitted.' 20 The District Court found, therefore, that one of the rights
retained by prisoners is the right to seek redress in the proper instance and the
right to communicate with those who can prosecute his petition. Concomitant
with the right to communicate is the right to prepare legal petitions, including
access to the necessary materials.' 2' This has been applied to legal materials,
writing materials, and even to the study of law. 22 The cases are based on
the idea that the right to prepare legal materials is necessary to the effective
utilization of the right to communicate with the courts. "Unless the vin-
dication of prisoner's rights is to be left to the discretion of the prison officials
-which is tantamount to denying that such rights exist-the right on which
all other rights for prisoners will turn is that of access to the courts.
'123
Is freedom of religion one of the rights retained by the prisoner when he
enters the penal institution? As a point of departure two aspects of religious
liberty, as it has been judicially evolved, should be noted. In Reynolds v.
United States, 24 which rejected the contention of a Mormon that, because of
his religious belief, he could not be prosecuted under a criminal statute pro-
hibiting polygamy, the Supreme Court drew the famous belief-practice
dichotomy. "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices."'' ' The second consideration is that first amendment freedoms
have a "preferred" status. It is against the tenets of these two concepts that
the practice of any religious activities must be tested. When the tests are
applied they must be applied in terms of the subsociety of the prison. The
first amendment alone, however, does not exhaust the constitutional guaran-
tees in regard to religious practice. The guarantee of equal protection in the
fourteenth amendment also has relevance.
There are several avenues of approach whenever religious liberty is in-
volved. The right can be viewed as "absolute" and subject to no substantive
regulation.126 The right can be "preferred" as having a higher dignity than
Ibid.
"Ibid.
"'See Note, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985, at 992-95 (1962).
' Bailleux v. Holmes, supra note 117; 58 Min. L. REV. 1233 (1960);39 TXAS L. REV.
228 (1960).
See Note, supra note 125, at 987.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
l Id. at 166.
"Black, The Bill of Rights, 55 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960). Mr. Justice Black has stated:
"It is my belief that there are "absolutes" in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there
on purpose by men who knew what words meant and meant their prohibitions to be
"absolutes." See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245:
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other rights. 27 Another approach is to describe religious freedom in terms of
all the surrounding circumstances and then balance it with the interests of
society viewed generally. 2s Religious liberty would then be viewed as sub-
ject to "reasonable" regulation and proscription. A last approach would be
to view the state and its functionaries as necessarily "neutral," neither in-
hibiting or promoting, the right to religious liberty. 29 The courts which
have dealt with the first amendment in terms of the open society have utilized
either one or more of these theoretical positions in justifying their decisions.
The question remains: what theoretical basis, if any, is instructive in work-
ing out an accommodation between religious liberty, on the one hand, and
the necessary regulation of the prison community, on the other.
In Fulwood v. Clemmer, Judge Matthews accepted the belief-act dichoto-
my of Reynolds. The initial proposition against which the opinion was
written was that under freedom of religion "a person has an absolute right
to embrace the religious belief of his choice." 30 The remainder of the opinion
carefully details the practice of the Muslim faith by Fulwood and the bases
upon which it was proscribed. Judge Matthews did not, however, deal with
the abstract question of how far practice could be limited, but based her deter-
minations on the concept of equality of treatment. The essential test, there-
fore, was not a free exercise one, but the Nondiscrimination Order issued by
the District Commissioners. 18 ' This, of course, leaves open whether the
activities involved are privileges or rights. Whether the prison officials dis-
criminate between religious groups in extending the privileges of practicing
their religion, says nothing as to whether these so-called privileges are in
reality protected constitutional rights.
The Nondiscrimination Order grew out of Sewell v. Pegelow.1 32 No sub-
stantive test of what are and what are not constitutionally protected rights
were presented there, for the court was dealing solely with the question of
whether a hearing should be granted. The issue was solely one of justici-
ability. In the last analysis, then, Sewell simply held that the court must hear
the complaint to determine whether the allegations gave rise to constitutional
questions, not that such questions were in fact presented. 33 From this view-
point, then, Judge Matthew's decision is hardly more instructive.
Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF.
L. REV. 821 (1962); LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960). For a recent criticism of the
"absolute" theory see Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark, 8 UTAH. L. REV. 167 (1963).
" See e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
' Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942); Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflec-
tions on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REv. 755 (1963),
1 See KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962).
13 Supra note 73, at 373.
1Id. at 374-376.
304 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1962).
Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
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In Banks v. Havener,3 4 on the other hand, the issue was squarely presented
and decided. The prison officials had suspended the application of the Non-
discrimination Order in light of the July riot. The basic right to practice was
therefore the issue. The officials had presented their conclusions from the
study of Muslim practices, and from the riot experiences, that practice of the
Muslim faith presented a clear and present danger. Judge Lewis, after noting
that members of other religious faiths had participated in the riots, dis-
counted the basis upon which that judgment was made. 135 He found that the
probability of subsequent riots, disruptive effect on the rehabilitive program,
and antipathy of other inmates and members of the staff did not constitute a
valid reason for the suspension of religious practices. "To justify the prohibi-
tion of the practice of an established religion at the Youth Center the prison
officials must prove by satisfactory evidence that the teachings and practice
of the sect creates a clear and present danger to the orderly functioning of the
institution.' 1 6 This, Judge Lewis concluded, they had not done.
Thus the religious issue as a constitutional right was joined. The Nondis-
crimination Order was, therefore, issued in pursuance of religious guarantees
and not based on privileges granted by grace of executive officials. It is clear
that if the officials of the prison chose to curtail all religious practices such
action would be unconstitutional even though it is nondiscriminatory. 137 The
court was unwilling to permit denials of freedom of religion even when
placed on the ground of administrative control of prison discipline which
has generally been held to justify denial of "lesser" rights.
The recognition of religious freedom as one of those rights reserved to the
prisoner on entering prison was not new with the Banks decision. 13 8 In Brown
v. McGinnis'3 9 the New York Court of Appeals spoke in clear and strong
language on this issue. Clarence Brown, an inmate of Green Haven Prison,
and his fellow Muslims held religious services in the prison yard because the
warden did not provide a meeting place. He alleged that he had been denied
the right to the ministrations of Muslim religious leaders. The Commissioner
of Correction claimed that the refusal to communicate with the local head
of the Muslim sect, Malcolm X Little, was based on the fact that Malcolm X





'3 Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 78. Contra, In Re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 667, 361 P.2d 417,
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961); Williford v. People of California, 217 F. Supp. 245 (N.D.
Cal. 1963). The California state and federal courts in Ferguson and Williford held that the
Muslim religion could be supressed even though other sects were allowed the practice of
their beliefs. These decisions would seem to be wrong. See Comment, 35 So. CAL. L. REV.
162 (1962); Note, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 501 (1962); Note, HARV. L. REV. 837 (1962).
"I McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957); Brown v.
McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962); Pierce v. La Valle, 293
F.2d 233 (2 Cir. 1961).
"I Supra note 138.
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had a criminal record. 140 It was further maintained that the exercise and en-
joyment of religious worship by an inmate of a penal institution was subject
to "reasonable rules and regulations" and that the Commissioner had not
abused his discretion in denying Brown the spiritual ministration requested.
The court, in the course of holding that Brown could force the prison authori-
ties to permit him free exercise of his religion, stated:
In support of the position which respondent has taken with respect to
petitioner's exercise of his religious belief, the Attorney-General has annexed
to his brief excerpts from various magazine and newspaper articles which
describe the "Muslim" cult to which the temple of Islam belongs. Respondent
maintains that the potential dangers inherent in permitting the dissemination
of their beliefs among the prison population warrant the restrictions imposed.
While such potential dangers, if realized, may justify the curtailment or with-
drawal of petitioner's qualified rights, mere speculation, based upon matters
dehors the record, is insufficient to sustain respondent's action. "
On the other hand, in all the cases which have dealt with religious freedom
in prison, the courts have rejected the proposition that the right to practice
is absolute. Judge Lewis in Banks stated:
Lest there be no misunderstanding, the practice of this right (religious free-
dom) in a penal institution is not absolute-it is subject to rules and regulations
necessary to the safety of the prisoners and the orderly functioning of the in-
stitution. Adherents of the Muslim faith, or of any other religious sect, found
guilty of violating established prison rules will not be heard to plead religious
persecution, absent unusual circumstances.'
How, then, can this interrelation of religious liberty and prison regulation
be tested? Judge Lewis, as was noted above, favors the application of the clear
and present danger test. He relied particularly on the following language of
Cantwell v. Connecticut:
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization
or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
Thus the Amendment [First] embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforce-
ment of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exer-
10 Id. at 531. Malcolm X. had been arrested in 1944 for larceny of a fur coat and in 1946
for breaking and entering and larceny for which he received four consecutive sentences of
eight to ten years each.
1 1 Id. at 535.
1' Supra note 78, at 11.
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cised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom. No one would contest the proposition that a State may not, by statute,
wholly deny the right to preach or to disseminate religious views. Plainly such
a previous and absolute restraint would violate the terms of the guarantee."
Although Cantwell did not deal specifically with religious freedom in penal
institutions, Judge Lewis found it "quite analogous and very persuasive."
Only the protection of the prison society could be a basis for limitation of
this freedom.
The clear and present danger test has been applied in a carefully reasoned
case involving a Catholic prisoner in New Jersey.144 James McBride had
refused to obey prison orders and repeatedly used foul and obscene language
to prison officials. For these offences he was placed in the prison's segregation
wing. A part of the punishment was that he could not attend Mass with the
rest of the Roman Catholic prisoners on Sundays and holy days of obligation.
Although the inmates in segregation were not permitted to accompany the
general prison population to the chapel, chaplains of each religious faith
were permitted to visit them in their cells. The Catholic chaplain, however,
refused to say Mass in the segregation wing which had no chapel. The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the freedom of a person to practice his
religion, whether in or out of prison, must be considered in the light of the
general welfare, that the Federal Constitution stands as a barrier against
unjust deprivation of civil liberties. However, religious freedoms could be
denied if the court found that the restrictions were reasonably necessary to
protect some paramount societal interest. 145 The social interest involved in
segregating the plaintiff was preservation of order and discipline in the
prison. His claim of religious freedom did not warrant desegregation for the
purpose of attending services. The prisoner brought this treatment on himself
and it was his position within the prison rather than of his faith which led
to the deprivation, and, therefore, it was not discriminatory. The prisoner was
allowed to receive religious consultation and the Sacraments through visits
of the Catholic chaplains. It was permissible for the prison authorities to
determine that attendance at Mass with the general prison population would
impair the disciplinary effect of the segration wing. The court held, therefore,
that the regulations did not constitute an unwarranted restriction upon the
prisoners' freedom of religion.' 46
The court in Brown v. McGinnis 47 based its decision on the principle that
freedom of exercise of religious worship is a preferred right. It cannot, there-
fore, interfere with the laws which the State enacts for its preservation, safety
310 U.S. 296 (1940), at 303-04.
'"McBride v. McCorkle, supra note 138.
"RId. at 479, 130 A.2d at 886-87.
Id. at 480, 130 A.2d at 887.
10 Supra note 138.
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or welfare. 148 This is consistent with the tests applied in both Banks and
McBride. As an operative proposition against which courts may test an
allegation of unconstitutional restriction, then, the following factors seem
crucial. 1) The rule or regulation must not be based solely on the religious
beliefs or practices of the prisoners. 2) Any rule must be demonstrably based
on the vital interest of the prison society not merely on discretion or judg-
ments not founded on factually present prison conditions. 3) The religious
activities must present a clear and present danger and not just a speculative or
anticipated danger to the prison society. 4) Any regulations of religious
activities must be reasonable when viewed in the context of other regulations
of the prison.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
Accepting this test, then, as a working basis, attention should now be turned
to the meaning of the clear and present danger test. This test has a venerable
tradition and has been a hallmark of decision in many of the cases concern-
ing civil liberties. Its initial statement was in Schenck v. U.S.,1 49 a case in-
volving free speech. Mr. Justice Holmes formulated the test in these words:
... We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitu-
tional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done .... The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.'
This test has been applied in a variety of contexts, e.g., cases involving free-
dom of assembly, 1 1 group libel legislation,
152 legislative investigations, 15
loyalty programs, 154 sedition,155 subversion,'56 comment on judicial proceed-
ings, 157 and obscenity. It would not be useful here to trace the evolution of
Id. at 535.
"'249 U.S. 47 (1919).
"Id. at 52.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951).
1 Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Barsky et. al v. U.S., 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948),
rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 971 (1950).
"5'Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
" Schenck v. US., supra note 149; Debs v. U.S. 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. U.S., 250
U.S. 616 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927); see CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN TiH UNrrED STATES (1941).
1"4American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
11Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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the test in all its configurations. There have been occasions, however, in which
the test was applied in cases with religious content. The most instructive is
the case relied on by Judge Lewis in Banks-Cantwell v. Connecticut.
158
The Jehovah's Witnesses were primarily responsible for the working out
of the posture of the free exercise clause when it is admixed with freedom of
the press and free speech. Cantwell arose out of the arrest of a father and his
two minor sons for engaging in the distribution of the literature of the
Jehovah's Witnesses and playing phonograph records setting out its doctrines.
They went from door to door selling and distributing pamphlets as well as
playing the records and proselytizing. The material was patently hostile to the
Catholic faith and was distributed, and the records played, in a neighborhood
which was 90% Catholic. The defendants were convicted under a Connecti-
cut statute prohibiting solicitation without a licence1 59 and for breach of the
peace, a common law crime in Connecticut. The state court stated the breach
of peace issue in these terms: "The doing of acts or the use of language which,
under circumstances of which the person is or should be aware, are calculated
or likely to provoke another person or other persons to acts of immediate vio-
lence may constitute a breach of the peace.... It is not necessary, as claimed,
to show that other persons were actually provoked to the point of violence or
disturbance of the peace."''10 In dealing with this aspect of the case the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Rutledge, stated:
Although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity, we
think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish
specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial in-
terest of the State, the petitioner's communication, considered in the light of
the constitutional guarantees, raised no such clear and present menace to public
peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the common law offense
in question1 l
Animosity, then, is not enough; suspicion of trouble is certainly not enough;
imminent danger of violence would seem to be required. The immediate
question is how instructive this view of the clear and present danger test can
be in the context of the prison community.
Judge Matthews in Fulwood faced the most immediate application of this
test in the Muslim cases. Unfortunately, she rested her analysis on freedom of
speech and the racial contents of Fulwood's remarks, rather than facing the
free exercise issue. Fulwood had been punished for the incident on the recre-
ation field in which he addressed other Muslims in the stands during a ball
5 Supra note 143.
20 CONN. GEN. STATS. § 6294 (1930), as amended by § 860 (d) of Connecticut Public Act
of 1937.
10 State v. Cantwell, 126 Conn. 1, 8 A.2d 533, 537 (1939).
181 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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game. Fulwood spoke of the beliefs and practices of the Muslims and the
writings of Elijah Muhammad. He also used abusive language in character-
izing whites as liars, etc. 162 This incident would seem a clear case of religious
proselytizing, and an apt opportunity for a discussion of the limitations on re-
ligious practice. While admitting the religious content in the "speech, "
1 63
Judge Matthews, however, dismissed that element and characterized the prob-
lem as arising out of the racial content of the words. 64 The conclusion was
stated that what Fulwood "said on racial matters caused tension and resent-
ment among inmates of both races and was of a character tending to breach
the peace."' 65 In drawing the conclusion that the prisoner could be punished
for this incident the judge relied on a relevant prison regulation, and the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire'66 and Feiner
v. New York.1
67
Chaplinsky was concerned with a state statute which incorporated the
common-law doctrine of "fighting words": "No person shall address any offen-
sive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any
street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive
name ... "168 The New Hampshire courts had interpreted the statute as
applicable only to the use in a public place of words directly tending to cause
a breach of the peace by the persons to whom the remark was addressed. The
conviction of a street speaker who called a policeman a "damned racketeer"
and a "damned fascist"'6 9 was upheld by the Supreme Court.
In the course of the opinion in Chaplinsky, Mr. Justice Murphy put any
religious issue to one side:
We cannot conceive that cursing a public officer is the exercise of religion in any
sense of the term. But even if the activities of the appellant which preceded the
incident could be viewed as religious in character, and therefore entitled to the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would not cloak him with
immunity from the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in vio-
lation of a valid criminal statute.
The Court did not give any credence to the religious issue. It treated the
appellant as it would treat any appellant speaking on a street corner.
It is interesting to note that Judge Matthews followed the same line in Ful-
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F.Supp. 370, 377-79 (1962).
"'Id. at 377.
" Id. at 378.
" Ibid.
i'6 Supra note 151.
'o'Ibid.
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wood in spite of the claimed religious character of the utterances. 7' In doing
so she selected the following language from Justice Murphy's opinion:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Con-
stitutional problem. These include . . . the insulting or 'fighting' words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.'
The issue was freedom of speech, not freedom of religion. "Petitioner's
racial preaching within the hearing of white and negro inmates was such as
to be offensive, insulting, and disturbing to white inmates and to non-Muslim
negroes and to engender those feelings which tend to menace order."'7 3 At
this point Feiner17 4 was cited by the Judge. That case involved addressing an
open-air meeting on a Syracuse, N.Y., street corner. The speech involved con-
tained derogatory remarks concerning President Truman, the American
Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse and other local political officials. There was
no religious content in the speech. The court placed its emphasis on the re-
action to the speech and not the content. As the reaction in the hearers was
such as would show a clear danger of disorder, Feiner was arrested. His con-
viction was upheld by the Supreme Court.
It is disappointing that Judge Matthews chose this free speech characteri-
zation. It would have been more instructive from the viewpoint of religious
liberty in prison, with which she had dealt in all other questions in Fulwood,
if she had tested the effect of the religious element in the speech. If she had,
the applicability of Supreme Court decisions which dealt with the religious
content question in relation to free speech and permissible regulation would
have been tested.175
The Fulwood decision is important, however, because it sets out the clear
and present danger test in relation to the prison. The presentation is instruc-
tive in delimiting the operation of the test in this setting.
It would seem clear that a prison regulation such as the one involved in
Fulwood is not only a proper, but necessary one. The rule reads in part: "It
is against the law to engage in a demonstration, disturbance, strike, or act of
resistance, either alone or in combination with others, which will tend to
breach the peace or which constitute disorderly conduct."' 76 This represents
a workable test in regard to the application of the clear and present danger
171 Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 162, at 378.
"' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra note 151, at 571-72.
lnFulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 162, at 378.
17, Feiner v. New York, supra note 151.
"' E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 143; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948);
Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
"I Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 162 at 378. (Emphasis supplied).
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standard to the prison community. Words or action which would tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace are clearly within the scope of proper
regulation. While there is some authority for a stricter test when religious
freedom is involved, this should not serve to attenuate the effectiveness of the
rule as an operative standard. At the same time, the test cannot operate on
a basis of mere speculation-whether the educated or experiential "guess"
of prison authorities or mere conclusory determinations not based on ascer-
tainable facts.
Reasonableness should always be the keystone of the permissible scope of
prison discretion. At one extreme, if fertility rights which included orgiastic
melees in the prison compound were a part of a primitive religion, it is clear
that such rites could be prohibited. It would also seem clear that a religious
Navajo's Indian hogan which included eating cactus containing peyote would
be prohibited, even though constitutionally protected in the open society. 176a
On the other hand, inmates meeting to discuss religion or to pray without
obstructing normal routine would not constitute a danger. The freedom of
exercise which is asserted by inmates must not bring them into collision with
the rights asserted by others. Behavior must be peaceable and orderly. The
test cannot be set down with definitive scope. No question should be raised
concerning the power of prison officials to regulate activities, to inspect, to
supervise, to discipline, etc. Defining the official's permissible sphere is as use-
less as trying to determine what religious freedom is in the abstract.
Muslims' beliefs are unpopular and resented. White inmates will resent be-
ing called liars, devils, slavers, etc. Negro inmates might well find militant
black supremacy obnoxious, especially as they try to work out a modus
vivendi with their white counterparts. In this context should the prison offi-
cials deny the Muslims their religious practices? The courts of California have
answered in the affirmative. 177 The courts dealing with Lorton, however, have
found that a complete proscription is unwarranted.
In the balance it would seem that if Muslim religious practices are treated
on the same basis with other religions the immediate danger would not be
present. Allowing them to meet together for services separate from other in-
mates, private religious reading, non-ostantatious wearing of religious
medals, and hearing instructions from their ministers would not seem in se
provocative of others. Annoyance, antagonism, and dislike on the part of
other prisoners should not be cumulated into an immediate danger. The
prison authorities, if put to the balance, should discipline and control the
others before they deny religious freedom. This is not meant to suggest that
violent speeches, inciting, and provocations by Muslims should be permitted;
17 People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964). See Casenote, infra.
17 See note 137 supra.
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rather, that normal religious practices should not be prohibited on the
tenuous basis of potential or suspected future dangers. Certainly, Judge
Matthews' decision as to each of the practices and incidents in the Fulwood
case represents such a balance.
Perhaps the closer question is presented in Banks.178 There the Muslims
were permitted religious exercises until the July 31st riots broke out. The
court found "some support in the record" that the Muslims were the "moti-
vating influence of the riot." The Director of the Department of Corrections
based his prohibition of practice of the Muslim faith within the guidelines of
the Nondiscrimination Order, on the judgment that the practice constituted
a clear and present danger. 179 It would seem at first blush this would be a
justifiable position. However, there was evidence that the Muslims were sub-
sequently allowed to hold informal meetings in the yard during recreation
periods. 8 0 This would seem to contradict the clarity and immediacy of any
danger. Where better would resentment be shown and tension accumulated
than in meetings held at recreation with other inmates present---even if
separated. Judge Lewis did not foreclose the possibility of restriction on the
basis of danger; he did require, and properly so, that the danger be immediate
and demonstrated from the facts. It is clear that the prison officials must be
able to act with dispatch when they see the tendency toward danger, but their
acts are subject to subsequent judicial justification. The mere presence of
Muslims is not a sufficient basis.
From this analysis, it is submitted that the clear and present danger test as
applied in the Fulwood and Banks cases is the best standard for testing the
limitations which can be placed on religious practices in prisons. The test
leaves to the prison officials the necessary flexibility and scope for action and
at the same time protects the prisoners from arbitrary religious classifications
and proscriptions. The preferred position corollary would also be required
when it is kept in mind that the courts, while recognizing rights in prisoners,
do so in a judicial process of selection as to which rights are attenuated and
which are to be recognized. The "absolute" position would not be workable
in the prison community, to say nothing of the dubiousness of its application
in the free community. The neutral principle would seem to be too vague
and difficult of application in the prison community, where state action is
the all encompassing operative factor, even if it were appropriate in the con-
text of society generally.
175 Banks v. Havener, Civil No. 3026-M, E.D. Va., Oct. 2, 1964.
119 Id. at 9.
110 Id. at 5.
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EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Not only is the free exercise clause of the first amendment involved once the
constitutional rights of prisoners to religious liberty is recognized, but also
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Concomitant with
the equal protection clause is the application of what might be styled the
"establishment clause backlash"-to use a popular contemporary figure. The
idea is a relatively simple one. If one religious group is allowed certain prac-
tices then all religious groups must be allowed the same practices. If a re-
ligious sect is prohibited from religious exercises on an equal basis with what
is allowed others, the effect is to establish the non-prohibited sects by making
them preferred religions. 18 '
This principle rests on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Jehovah's
Witnesses cases. The first dealt with the equal protection clause, the second
with the preferred religion problem. In Niemotko v. Maryland'82 the defend-
ant Witnesses were refused permission by the city officials of Havre de Grace,
Maryland, to use a public park for religious speeches while the same privileges
had been given to other groups. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, in overturning the
arrests of the defendants, stated that ". . . rarely has any case been before this
Court which shows so clearly an unwarranted discrimination .... The con-
clusion is inescapable that the use of the park was denied because of the City
Council's dislike for or disagreement with the Witnesses or their views.'
183
The convictions were invalid, therefore, because of the equal protection
clause. In the second case, Fowler v. Rhode Island,84 Witnesses had been
arrested for violation of an ordinance that forbade speeches in public parks.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated:
Catholics could hold mass in Slater Park and Protestants could conduct their
church services there without violating the ordinance. Church services normally
entail not only singing, prayer, and other devotionals but preaching as well.
Even so, those services would not be barred by the ordinance. That broad con-
cession, made in oral argument, is fatal to Rhode Island's case. For it plainly
shows that a religious service of Jehovah's Witnesses is treated differently than a
religious service of other sects. That amounts to the state preferring some
religious groups over this one.'
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who concurred, was unwilling to base his decision
""It should be noted that this is also very close to Professor Kurland's thesis. KURLAND,
op. cit. supra note 129.
-340 U.S. 268 (1951).
SId. at 272.
1S 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
0 Id. at 69.
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on the first amendment, but would have relied solely on the equal protection
clause.
The first hint of this line of argument in the Lorton cases was outlined in
the petition in Sewell v. Pegelow.186 The basis of the complaint was that the
Muslim petitioners "are forbidden to wear medals symbolic of their faith
while 'that privilege is accorded to Catholics, Baptists, etc.'; that unlike
prisoners of other faiths, they are denied all opportunity to communicate
with their religious advisers, recite their prayers or receive desired publica-
tions without fear of being persecuted.' 87 In the Nondiscrimination Order
there is a continual refrain that the privileges will be made available "in the
same manner and to the same extent as (to) inmates of Christian or other
persuasions."' 8 8 Again, the same principle of nondiscrimination was the crux
of Judge Matthews' opinion in Fulwood v. Clemmer.
In the Banks case an even wider application of the principle of nondis-
crimination was utilized. The petitioners claimed that the Director of Cor-
rection discriminated between treatment of Muslims in Lorton Reformatory
and the D.C. Jail, where religious practices were allowed, and Lorton Youth
Center, where they were proscribed.189 They also claimed discrimination on
the basis of the religious practices allowed other inmates within the Youth
Center. Judge Lewis concluded his opinion: "Therefore, an appropriate
order will be entered herein permitting all inmates at the Youth Center who
are adherents of the Muslim faith to practice their religion at the Youth
Center on a non-discriminatory basis so long as it does not present a clear and
present danger to the orderly functioning of the institution."'9 0
While nondiscrimination is a crucial consideration in working out what
rights are preserved to prisoners it is well to keep in mind Justice Douglas'
caveat in Murdock v. Pennsylvania:
The fact that the ordinance (against distribution of literature without a
licence) is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded by the
First Amendment is not so restricted .... Freedom of press, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion are in a preferred position.'
Two tests emerge from the opinions in the Lorton cases: preferred position
subject to the limitations of the clear and present danger test, and non-dis-
crimination. The latter principle seems more nearly applicable to those
aspects of religious practice in prison which may be described as privileges.
In extending privileges to members of the subsociety, the state must extend
' Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
' Id. at 197.
Ibid.
Banks v. Havener, supra note 178, at 8.
'MId. at 11.
'319 U.S. at 115 (1943).
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them to all on an equal basis, without any classification in terms of religion.
This does not weaken the application of the first principle which applies to
preferred rights. While privileges might be taken away if there is no discrimi-
nation, rights cannot be excised unless there is full justification in terms of
a basic societal interest. While nondiscrimination might be viewed and
applied mechanically, the clear and present danger test will always be
weighted in terms of the configuration of the fact situation presented.
The application of these tests to specific rights might best be seen in terms
of the specific rights for which the Muslims fought. All of them have been
incorporated into the Order on Nondiscrimination issued by the District
Commissioners.
THE NONDISCRIMINATION ORDER1 92 AND THE RIGHTS INVOLVED
A. Remedy
Any person who has been aggrieved because the policy of this section has not
been adhered to may, within ten days, file with the Secretary of the Board of
Commissioners a written statement of the alleged violation setting forth specifi-
cally and in detail the facts of the matter. The Commissioners will thereafter
cause an investigation to be made and, in the event that the complaint is justi-
fied, will take appropriate action.'
The initial section of the District Commissioners' Order secures the right of
access to administrative remedies. In the Fulwood case the prisoner had been
placed in a control cell because of the complaints he attempted to communi-
cate under this section. Of several letters, only one had been transmitted by
the Director to the Commissioners, and that was one day late. 194 Judge
Matthews found this conduct violative of the Order in that it was "the
petitioner's right to set forth the factual allegations relied upon by him, even
though they were derogatory or critical of prison authorities."' 19 5 The punish-
ment of the petitioner was, therefore, a violation of his right to seek redress
of alleged grievances. This right is a close parallel to the constitutional right,
discussed above, concerning access to the courts. It is clear, however, that
remedies under the Nondiscrimination Order must be exhausted before the
courts will hear the prisoner's complaint.
B. Recognition of the Muslims as a Religion
The order specifically guarantees the prisoner the right to be recognized as
19 Supra note 49.
'Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 133, at 670.
a' Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 162, at 376.
19 Ibid.
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a member of the Muslim sect and to practice his religion on the same basis as
other religious groups.196
C. Private Study of Religion
Questions concerning the private study of religious material have been pre-
sented in all the cases involving Black Muslims. Censorship in the dissemi-
nation of ideas has long been a concern of the Supreme Court, and censorship
of religious ideas has been particularly guarded. 197 In Pierce v. LaVallee, s98
the right of Muslim prisoners in New York prisons to have access to copies of
the Koran was upheld. The court even went so far as to imply that the cor-
rect edition was necessary to avoid unwarranted interference with religious
freedom. This same right was specifically recognized in both Fulwood and
Banks. In recognition of this right, the Commissioners ordered that copies of
the Koran be made available to the Muslims on the same basis as copies of the
Bible are made available to Catholics and Protestants. The Commissioners
also specify that the copies shall be translations "previously indicated by them
as acceptable to their sect."' 99
The receipt of newspapers and periodicals, on the other hand, has not
been recognized as a constitutional right.200 It is a matter of prison regulation.
This is consistent with religious freedom since such reading material, unlike
basic religious texts, is not a necessary part of the practice of religion. While
the order does not mention the newspaper Muhammad Speaks, it specifically
witholds permission to subscribe to the Los Angeles Dispatch. 01 Judge
Matthews was presented with this question in Fulwood. She noted that the
prison officials had confiscated the Dispatch because "both white and negro
inmates were agitated by Mr. Muhammad's inflammatory articles in the
mentioned newspaper." 202 In spite of the fact that over three hundred news-
papers were received by inmates, and that the Daily Worker was the only
other newspaper confiscated, Judge Matthews concluded that receipt of news-
papers was a matter of discretion by prison officials and no abuse of discretion
was shown here.
D. Religious Meetings
The Commissioners ordered that the Muslims be permitted periodic meetings
for the purpose of prayer, study and discussion of their faith at reasonable
times and places.203 This would seem to be the basic practice which should
I"Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 133, at 671.
19 See e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
108 Supra note 138.
10 Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 133, at 671.
See e.g., White v. Clemmer, 295 F.2d 132 (1961).
201 Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 133, at 671.
m Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 162, at 375.
2Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 133, at 671.
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be protected, subject, of course, to the clear and present danger rule. When
religious meetings threaten the end of the prison society in providing safe-
keeping, care, protection, etc., they can be limited. Also, an individual's right
to participate in such a meeting may be circumscribed as was recognized by
the court in McBride v. McCorkle.20 4 At the very least Muslims must be
afforded the same opportunity for public worship as other prisoners. This
right, however, would seem subject to greater vigilance than the right to
possess religious materials. The latter touches more closely the absolute right
to believe, while the former is a preferred right involving free exercise.
Implicit in the reasoning of both the McBride court and the Fulwood court
is a recognition of this difference.
The right to have ministers conduct the meetings is another matter.
Obviously a Catholic mass cannot be conducted without a priest, and many
Protestant services require the presence of ministers. The same right, on an
equal basis, is granted the Muslims under the Nondiscrimination Order.
20 5
This right, however, is not without limitations. As in the case of Brown v.
McGinnis,20 6 a minister may be excluded on the basis of a former criminal
record. This is a particularly difficult problem in relation to Muslims because
many of their ministers were converted in prison. This regulation meets the
test of reasonableness, although it is doubtful if ministers can be excluded
altogether. This is certainly true if to do so would violate equal protection.
E. Correspondence with Religious Leaders
Ordinarily the regulation of the mail of prisoners is a matter within the
administrative discretion of prison officials. This is subject to exception, how-
ever, when the mails are necessary to secure a fundamental right. Such is the
case when correspondence is necessary to obtain access to the courts. 207 Com-
munication with ministers of religion is not fundamental to the practice of
religion, although greater consideration should be given to this type of corre-
spondence than merely social letters. This preference was not accorded in
Fulwood, however. Prison authorities had declined to allow Fulwood to corre-
spond with Elijah Muhammad and the petitioner sought to compel the
director to allow him that privilege. Judge Matthews' discussion of mail
privileges is illustrative of the twilight area which always exists when prison
regulations are weighted against prisoners' desires.
Mail lists are established for inmates so that they may maintain legitimate
familial, legal, welfare and employment contacts. Usually the mail lists include
relatives. If inmates have no relatives or none that can be reached, then the mail
lists include friends, and occasionally ministers. A minister is customarily put
Supra note 138.
Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 133, at 671.
206 Supra note 138.
211 See notes 113-117 supra.
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on the mailing list where the inmate prior to entering prison knew the minister.
When it has seemed desirable for the good of the inmate, permission has been
given for correspondence with a minister the inmate did not know when he
entered prison. There is no rigid rule governing mail lists. Petitioner has rela-
tives and apparently has never met Mr. Muhammad. "
She concluded, therefore, that mail lists were matters of prison regulation
and that Fulwood had not made a showing sufficient to establish a violation
of a legal right.
The Nondiscrimination Order allows the Muslims to correspond with
Elijah Muhammad or Lucius X. Brown, the Washington minister. This
privilege is to be carried out in conformity "with normal prison procedures,
including usual and generally applicable censorship."
20 9
F. Religious Insignia
A religious insignia can be of such proportions and of such material as to be
a dangerous weapon. Possession and wearing of such medals must come under
prison control. However, if other prisoners are allowed harmless insignia, it
would be discrimination to deny the same right to Muslims. This was the
position taken in Fulwood v. Clemmer where it was pointed out that Catholic
and Protestant medals were considered regular prison issue.2 1 0 The wearing
of such medals is considered of great importance to Muslims, the medal being
worn outside of the shirt. The Commissioners' Order delimits this question
very specifically, and, by any test, reasonably.
Muslim inmates may carry on their persons non-dangerous medals showing
the Islamic star and crescent. Such medals may be displayed in the same manner
and to the same extent as Christian and other religious medals are permitted
to be displayed. Inmate welfare funds will be made available to furnish medals
to Muslims on the same basis as medals are furnished to inmates of other
religions.'
G. The Right to Proselytize
It has already been pointed out that the landmark decisions on free exercise
have concerned the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses to proselytize. The clear and
present danger test was formulated, in relation to religion, in a series of cases
which balanced municipal licensing with freedom of religion. The right to
preach is a part of the right to proselytize, and free speech involved with
religious content has been accorded preferred treatment by the courts. This
is one area, however, where the possibilities for trouble with regard to the
Muslims in prison can be acute. The playing field incident in the Fulwood
case is a pertinent example.
Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 162, at 375.
N Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 133, at 671.210 Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 162, at 374.
m Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 133, at 671.
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This is the area where freedom of religion blends into freedom of speech.
The social difficulty presented by the Muslims is analogous to the Jehovah's
Witnesses. As Professor Kurland has written: "It is not infrequent that those
most intolerant of the rights of others are the most vigorous in seeking the
protection of their own." 212 The cases involving the Witnesses have resulted
in a confusion of doctrine between freedom of religion and free speech but
have also resulted in the "expansion of the right of militant minority sects
to the protection of the state in their virulent attacks on the views of
others."
218
This was clearly the case with Fulwood's virulent preaching in the prison
yard. Judge Matthews had little difficulty, however, in finding that the situa-
tion presented the requisite clear and present danger to punish the prisoner.
This points up the fact that constitutional doctrine cannot, and should not,
be applied automatically from the open society to the prison subsociety. Our
analogies, of necessity, limp. It is evident that preaching, especially preaching
black supremacy, must be curtailed. The peace and order of the prison com-
munity requires it. This should not create any problems in the application of
the tests outlined above, however, for the cornerstone of the balance of in-
terests test is the societal interests of the prison.
Private proselytizing, however, is another matter. If it is carried on in
private conversations and does not tend to incite the hearer, then it should
be protected. The Commissioners have followed this distinction, though they
have camouflaged it in equal protection language. The regulation reads:
A Muslim inmate may discuss his religion with other inmates only in the same
manner and to the same extent as inmates of Christian or other persuasions
are permitted to discuss their religions with other inmates. (Emphasis added)."
The discretion and control of the prison authorities is completely preserved
in this ruling. However, that discretion must be subject to the rule of "reason-
ableness" contained in the balance of interests principle. Prohibition of all
religious discussion would be suspect and should give rise to administrative
or judicial review of the factors leading to such a decision. It has been sug-
gested, however, that total silence in a prison, the so-called Auburn system,
would not be unconstitutional on its face.215 This conclusion would seem
dubious in relation to the premises of New Penology. It can be concluded
that while proselytizing presents a more closely drawn line, the line of protec-
tion nevertheless exists.
'2 KURLAND, op. cit supra note 129, at 50.
" Ibid.
2' Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 133, at 671.
"Comment, Black Muslims in Prison, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1488, at 1501. But cf. Ibid. note
62 and cases cited therein.
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CONCLUSION
There are very few times when man's inhumanity to man knows such excess
as when man justifies his inhumanity by deifying it. This deification can
come in the guise of religious zeal, religious intolerance, or active secularism
raised to the ironic pitch of a "holy" war. It was the realization of this which
led reasonable men to determine that intellectual freedom was essential to
the peaceful ordering of society. Whenever an attempt is made to determine
what course should be taken when this rational ideal conflicts with social in-
terests, the scene is set for one of the most important and necessary accommo-
dations man must make. This is the problem and challenge of the first amend-
ment. The theories for the accomplishment of this accommodation are many,
the practical areas of conflict inexhaustible.
Religious freedom versus the interests of the prison subsociety is only one
manifestation of this accommodation-a most provocative manifestation.
Pluralism and prison seem logical contradictories, but the ingenuity and
humanity of man has never balked at the possibility of successfully living with
contradictions. By avoiding dogma and expediency, a middle ground can be
found which will best serve that magnificent compromise we choose to call
pluralism. With this thought in mind the anguish of Lorton can be instruc-
tive rather than descriptive.
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